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Economic Analysis of Trade-offs between Justices 
by Prof. Dr. Stefan Baumgärtner, Stefanie Glotzbach, Nikolai Hoberg, 
Martin F. Quaas and Klara Helene Stumpf
bstract: We argue that economics –
as the scientific method of analysing
trade-oﬀs – can be helpful (and may
even be indispensable) for assessing the trade-
oﬀs between intergenerational and intragene-
rational justice. Economic analysis can
delineate the “opportunity set” of politics with
respect to the two normative objectives of inter-
and intragenerational justice, i.e. it can des-
cribe which outcomes are feasible in achieving
the two objectives in a given context, and
which are not. It can distinguish eﬃcient from
ineﬃcient uses of instruments of justice. It can
identify the “opportunity cost” of attaining one
justice to a higher degree, in terms of less achie-
vement of the other. We find that, under very
general conditions, (1) eﬃciency in the use of
instruments of justice implies that there is ri-
valry between the two justices and the oppor-
tunity cost of either justice is positive; (2)
negative opportunity costs of achieving one
 justice exist if there is facilitation between the two
justices, which can only happen if instruments
of justice are used ineﬃciently; (3) opportunity
costs of achieving one justice are zero if the two
justices are independent of each other, which is
the case in the interior of the opportunity set
where instruments of justice are used
 ineﬃciently.
I. Introduction
Justice is a multifarious normative idea
about the quality of relationships among
members of society. One may argue that
there are many “justices”, insofar as diﬀerent
parts of society, diﬀerent types of relationships,
or diﬀerent substantive areas are addressed.
The overall societal goal (“vision”) of
 sustainability particularly addresses two
 justices: (i) justice between currently living
persons (“intragenerational justice”), and (ii)
justice between members of present and
 future generations (“intergenerational
 justice”). 1,2
With two (or more) diﬀerent justices as
normative objectives of equal rank, it may
be that there exists a trade-oﬀ between them,
that is, performing better with regard to one
objective implies performing worse with re-
gard to the other one. In particular, it may
be that fostering intragenerational justice
makes it more diﬃcult to attain inter -
generational justice, and vice versa. Such a
trade-oﬀ at the level of normative objectives
of equal rank – if it exists – asks for societal
resolution. The question is: how to act in the
face of diﬀerent justices? Important exam-
ples for such a trade-oﬀ include government
spending on social welfare vs. investment in
public infrastructure and education, or the
exploitation vs. conservation of non-
 renewable natural resources.
In this essay, we argue that economics –
as the scientific method of analysing trade-
oﬀs – can be helpful (and may even be in-
dispensable) for assessing the trade-oﬀs
between diﬀerent justices. We understand
economics as being defined by its method,
rather than by its subject matter or by some
normative objective,3 and we sketch how to
employ this method to analyse trade-oﬀs
between justices. An important contribution
that economics can make to this analysis is
to introduce the secondary normative
 criterion of eﬃciency which characterises the
non-wasteful use of scarce resources to attain
the primary normative objectives of justice:
a situation is eﬃcient with regard to
 diﬀerent objectives if it is not possible to
 improve on one objective with out doing
worse on another one.  Being derived from
primary normative objectives, the criterion
of eﬃciency itself makes a normative claim:
it is good to use scarce resources eﬃciently to
attain intra- and intergenerational justice; it
is wrong to use scarce resources ineﬃciently
for that purpose.
This approach of using economics as a
method to study the eﬃcient use of scarce
resources in the attainment of rivaling nor-
mative objectives of justice4 opens an inno-
vative perspective on what the role of
economics should be (as a method) in the
discussion of justice, and on how to bridge
the gap – systematically and rigorously –
between ideal theory and non-ideal politics.
II. Specifying justice(s)
To inform our understanding of intra- and
intergenerational justice, the abstract and
 general concept of justice needs to be further
specified. We take justice to generally refer
to the mutual claims of members of the
community of justice from the standpoint
of impartiality.5 This minimum definition
leaves ample room for very diﬀerent, and
 sometimes much contested, conceptions of
 justice. Each of them can be described more
precisely by specifying a number of elements
in a “syntax of justice”.6,7 In the following,
we specify the essential elements of the syn-
tax to clarify the conceptions of inter- and
intragenerational justice.
The community of justice. Justice refers to
mutual claims8 within a community of
 justice. We term those holding a particular
claim the claim holders, and those responsi-
ble for the fulfilment of the claim the claim
addressees.9 Intragenerational justice entails
claims held by currently living persons (claim
holders) towards other currently  living
 persons (claim addressees). Inter generational
justice entails claims held by persons living
in the future (“future generations”, claim
holders) towards persons living today (claim
addressees).10 It is not necessary that such a
claim is explicitly put forward by the claim
holder (which may be impossible in the case
of intergenerational justice). What matters
is that a legitimate claim might be formulated
by someone speaking for the claim holder.
Positive and negative claims. Generally,
claims can be positive, i.e. defining an  en -
title ment to a certain good,11 or negative, i.e.
demanding freedom from harm.12 Claims
are considered legitimate if they could be
agreed on from the standpoint of impartiality
and equal consideration. For example,  inter -
generational justice claims could be  specified
as a positive claim of future  genera tions to
certain stocks and systems, such as a
 democratic political system, a stock of
 manufactured capital and critical know -
ledge, or intact ecosystems, implying a
 responsibility of the present generation to
pass on these stocks and systems in a good
state to future generations. Future generations
may also have a negative claim: not to be
A
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to a higher degree does not necessitate any
change in the degree to which one attains
the other one.20 
2) Facilitation: Achieving one objective sup-
ports achieving the other one, that is, attain -
ing one objective to a higher degree  in duces
a higher degree of attainment of the other
one.21,22
3) Rivalry: A fundamental rivalry (or “trade-
oﬀ”) exists between the objectives of intra-
and intergenerational justice, that is, attain -
ing one objective to a higher degree
 necessari ly reduces the degree to which one
attains the other one.23
For illustration, we give examples from
diﬀerent contexts. Independency is an
 assumption frequently made in ecological,
environmental and resource economics.24
For example, cap-and-trade systems for
greenhouse gas emissions imply that the
overall intergenerational impact on global
climate can be governed independently of
the initial intragenerational distribution of
emission certificates.25 Facilitation is promi-
nently stated with regard to the provision of
public goods. For instance, public invest-
ment in education or the improvement of
public transportation systems may simul -
taneously benefit today’s poor and future
persons. Rivalry is often assumed when the
possibility of intragenerational redistribu-
tion of access rights to rival resources is
 heavi ly limited. In such cases, meeting the
legitimate claims of the poor to the resource
possibly reduces the total resource stock
 passed on to future generations and,  thereby,
may be at the expense of intergenerational
justice. For example, if the government
spends a higher share of tax revenue to in-
crease social support of the poor without
being able to enforce higher taxes on the
rich, the government has less revenue to
 invest in public infrastructure and education.
A host of specific determinants – natural,
technological and institutional factors –
 impact on the production relationship
 between intra- and intergenerational justice,
for example because they influence the
 availa bility and eﬀectiveness of the instru-
ments of justice. Thereby, they aﬀect which
relationship holds. Two examples for such
determinants are population development
and political restrictions. In many countries
of the global North, a population develop-
ment characterised by higher life expectancy
and lower birth rates challenges the existing
social security systems. A potential trade-oﬀ
among the goal to reduce old-age poverty
present and future generations against claim
addressees in the present generation, which
are to be satisfied by certain instruments of
justice.
As we discuss two diﬀerent justices, both
of which demand the fulfilment of legiti-
mate claims through the use of instruments
of justice by the same addressee, a non- trivial
decision problem arises for this addressee –
the present generation. We therefore need to
have a closer look at the possible relation -
ships of these two justices.
III. Relationships between justices
Generally, the two justices are related both
on the “value” side and the “production”
side.16 On the value side, the relationship
 refers to the desirability, from a societal
point of view, of attaining one justice relative
to the other one. For example, society may
be willing to trade-oﬀ one justice against the
other,17 or one justice might strictly dominate
the other. In this essay, we build on the
 minimal and very general premise, widely
held in the literature,18 that both intra- and
intergenerational justice are considered by
society as desirable normative objectives of
equal rank. Beyond that, we do not further
discuss the value side.
On the production side, the relationship
refers to the feasible outcomes of the use of
instruments of justice, that is, combinations
of degrees of attainment of both justices.
Here, what is feasible is determined by the
structure and functioning of the given  system,
based on natural resource endow ments,
technology, institutions, etc. The set of all
feasible combinations in terms of the two
 justices is called the “opportunity set”. It
 describes society’s options for choice, which
are independent of what society considers
desirable. That is, the production side and
the value side are independent of each other.
Scientific analysis and political
 implementation have shown that, in  general,
three relationships may hold on the
 production side between intra- and inter -
generational  justice:19
1) Independency:The objectives of intra- and
intergenerational justice can be achieved in-
dependently, that is, attaining one objective
harmed by any activities of the presently
 living generation, e.g. through increasing
 systemic risks caused by a dysfunctional
 global financial  system or through nuclear
waste left over as a byproduct of present
 electricity production. Intragenerational
 justice claims include the positive claim for
satisfaction of basic needs, and the negative
claim that one’s freedoms should not be
 harmed (human rights).
Judicandum. We use the term judicandum to
describe that which is to be judged as just or
unjust. Judicanda can be agents, actions,
 institutions or states of the world.13 When
discussing inter- and intragenerational
 justice, the judicanda could be the actions
of currently living persons (and the conse-
quences of these actions, such as, say, the
 distribution of certain primary goods), as the
claim addressees of both justices belong to
the  current generation. 
Instruments of justice. We use the term
 instrument of justice to describe that which
is to be used to satisfy the legitimate claims
of  justice. In many conceptions of justice,
these will be objects of distribution (answers
to the question “What is distributed?”14),
but the satisfaction of legitimate claims
could also be achieved via, say, institutional
reform to ensure procedural justice. So, the
question here is how legitimate claims are
addressed. For example, one instrument of
intergenerational justice could be the  invest -
ment in public goods such as education and
infrastructure, or the distribution of stocks
of non-renewable resources between
 diﬀerent generations. The aim of intra -
generational  justice could, for example,
 require institutional reform of international
trade rules (“fairness”).
Metric for the judgment. For statements
about the degree of attainment of a norma-
tive objective, there must be some way to
measure the justice of the judicanda: one
needs a metric to judge whether, and to
what extent, a judicandum is just or unjust.
For this metric, diﬀerent informational bases
have been proposed, such as e.g. capabilities,
primary goods, or utility.15 It is possible to
use diﬀerent metrics for inter- and intra -
generational justice.
In sum, judging a certain judicandum as
inter- or intragenerationally just according
to a metric requires first to specify the posi-
tive and negative claims of claim holders in
5
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reduces the total resource stock 
passed on to future generations and,
there by, may be at the expense of 
intergenerational justice.”
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in the attainment of these objectives. Very
often, the use of instruments of justice
means employing scarce resources that may
be used in alternative ways.26 This is where
the key contribution of economics to the
study of societal problems comes in: how to
use scarce resources eﬃciently in the attain-
ment of some objectives? According to a
classical definition, economics
studies human behaviour as a relation-
ship between [given] ends and scarce 
means which have alternative uses.27
With this definition, economists generally
understand eﬃciency as non-wastefulness in
the use of “scarce means” to attain some
“ends” that humans pursue in their actions.
In this understanding, ends are open-ended:
they are not determined by economics as a
method. In principle, it could be any ends
that humans pursue. Here, we focus on
intra- and intergenerational justice as two
primary normative objectives that humans
pursue.28 Drawing on the common defini-
tion of eﬃciency by Pareto (1906),29 one can
define eﬃciency as follows: 
An allocation of resources is eﬃcient 
if it is impossible to move toward the 
attainment of one social objective 
without moving away from the 
attainment of another objective.30 
The minimal assumption needed to define
eﬃciency in this way is that, for each justice,
the metric of justice allows a distinction to
be made between a higher and a lower
 degree of attainment of the respective
 justice. In particular, it is neither necessary
to assume cardinality of each metric nor
commensurability of the two justices.31
Thus, this notion of eﬃciency and the
 subsequent analysis are very general.
If eﬃciency is related in this manner to
some primary normative objectives, it
 acquires the status of a secondary normative
objective.32,33 This means, it is good to use
resources eﬃciently; it is wrong to use them
ineﬃciently. In this perspective, the contri-
bution of economics to the study of societal
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problems lies in characterising the (in)eﬃ-
cient use of scarce means in the attainment
of multiple primary normative objectives.
For this purpose, economics provides a
broad set of methods to analyse, display and
empirically verify the relationships between
these objectives.
Figure one: Rivalry and independency
Figure two: Rivalry, facilitation, and 
independency
Figures one and two illustrate the
 opportunity set and eﬃciency in attaining
the two normative objectives of intra- and
intergenerational justice. The axes indicate
the degree of attainment of inter- and intra-
generational justice, respectively, based on
the respective metrics of justice. Thus each
point in the diagram represents an outcome
of the use of the instruments of justice. In
Figure one, the shaded area depicts all
 feasible outcomes in the given context, that
is, for given resource endowment, techno-
logy, institutions, and the like (“opportunity
set”). The curve JPF (“justice possibility
frontier”) denotes its frontier. Outcomes to
the northeast of this curve are not feasible in
the given context. Point A represents an out-
come where the instruments of justice are
used in an ineﬃcient manner as more inter-
generational justice could be achieved with -
out sacrificing intragenerational justice. In
contrast, the use of the instruments of  justice
in point B is eﬃcient as no higher degree of
attainment of one justice is feasible without
reducing the other one. Generally, all
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(intragenerational justice), and the goal to
avoid an unacceptably high financial burden
on the young generation (intergenerational
justice) may occur. Political restrictions limit
the political scope for redistribution of
 resources within a society. If, for instance,
the political scope for redistribution of
 wealth within a society is tight due to resis -
tance against introduction of an inheritance
tax, the situation of the poor can only be im-
proved by increasing public expenditures
and, thereby, possibly adding to public debt
in the long term – therefore causing a trade-
oﬀ between inter- and intragenerational
 justice.
Regarding the production relationship
between intra- and intergenerational justice
in the use and conservation of ecosystem ser-
vices, Glotzbach and Baumgärtner (in press:
Sec. four) found that the determinants im-
pacting on this relationship are the quantity
and quality of ecosystem services, popula-
tion development, the substitutability of
ecosystem services by human-made goods
and services, technological progress, and
 institutions and political restrictions. The
determinant substitutability of ecosystem
services, for instance, influences the charac-
ter of the relationship between the justices
as follows: if an ecosystem service is substi-
tutable by human made goods and services,
an overexploitation of the ecosystem service
by members of the present generation to
 increase intragenerational justice can be
compensated by suﬃcient investment in
other forms of physical, social and human
capital to secure intergenerational justice –
the relationship between the justices is one
of independency or facilitation. If an  eco -
system service is non-substitutable, an over-
 ex ploita tion of the ecosystem service by
members of the present generation to
 increase intragenerational justice cannot be
compensat ed and, hence, reduces the degree
of intergenerational justice – the relation ship
between the justices is one of rivalry.
In sum, the opportunity set, which
 embodies information on the production
 relationships between the two justices in all
feasible outcomes, crucially depends on a
number of fundamental context-specific
 determinants.
IV. Scarcity, economic eﬃciency, and  
opportunity costs
Irrespective of which production relation -
ship holds between inter- and intragenera-
tional justice, society has to make a decision
on how to use some instruments of justice
“The contribution of economics to
the study of societal problems lies 
in characterising the (in)efficient use 
of scarce means in the attainment 
of multiple primary normative 
objectives.”
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necessarily induce a higher degree of inter-
generational justice. Hence, the opportunity
cost of increasing intergenerational justice is
negative: increasing intergenerational justice
does not incur a loss, but a gain of intra -
generational justice, and the opportunity cost
of increasing intragenerational justice is zero.
In outcome F, the situation is reversed:
 attaining intragenerational justice to a  higher
degree facilitates attaining intergenerational
justice to a higher degree, but not vice versa;
hence, the opportunity cost of increasing
 intragenerational justice is negative, while
the opportunity cost of increasing interge-
nerational justice is zero. Generally, all (in-
eﬃcient) uses of instruments of justice along
increasing parts of the JPF correspond to
outcomes where attaining one justice to a
higher degree facilitates attaining the other
one, but not vice versa, so that the former
has negative opportunity cost, while the
 latter has zero opportunity cost.
For example, the opportunity set of
 Figure two may refer to government spen-
ding on education, where a broader educa-
tional base decreases income inequality
within a generation (intragenerational
 justice), and at the same time increases
 prospects for economic growth over time
(intergenerational justice).
As the figures and examples illustrate,
the shape of the opportunity set may diﬀer
from context to context, and with it the
 relationships between the two justices.34 As
the opportunity set is fundamentally deter-
mined by natural resource endowment,
technology, institutions, etc. (cf. Section
III), a change in these fundamental deter-
minants may change the opportunity set
and the relationships between the two justi-
ces. For  example, with given endowment of
a non-renewable resource, technical progress
in  resource extraction would shift the JPF-
curve in Figure one outwards. 
V. Conclusion
Robbins’ (1932) definition of economics
 delimits the contribution of economics to
the study of normative questions. It does not
lie in determining what ends to pursue or in
developing the means to achieve a normative
objective. Rather, the focus of economic ana-
lysis is on eﬃciency, i.e. non-wastefulness in
the use of scarce resources that have alterna-
tive uses as means to attain given normative
objectives. “Its (economics) contribution lies
in pointing out clearly ineﬃcient outcomes,
and in identifying the opportun ity costs of
moving from one eﬃcient outcome to  an -
other.”
Thus, in contexts where there is no
 scarcity or no alternatives exist, economics
does not lend itself to the discussion of
 normative questions. Yet, many  questions of
justice arise under conditions of scarcity and
involve the freedom to make choices. Such
questions can be discussed in economic
terms. 
Economic analysis of inter- and intrage-
nerational justice builds on three fundamen-
tal, and rather weak, assumptions:
(1) On the “value” side, the two justices are
considered by society to be of equal rank. 
(2) For each justice, one can measure the de-
gree to which one attains this justice. This
measurement does not need to be cardinal
but may be ordinal, and the two justices do
not need to be commensurable but the two
metrics may be in diﬀerent units.  
(3) For a given context – specified by natur -
al, technological, institutional factors, etc. –
one can describe the outcome of using scarce
resources (as instruments of justice) in terms
of these measures of the two justices.
With these assumptions, the genuine
and original contribution of an economic
analysis of justice is threefold:
(1) Economic analysis can delineate the “op-
portunity set” of politics with respect to the
two normative objectives of inter- and intra-
generational justice, i.e. it can describe which
outcomes are feasible in achieving the two
objectives in a given context, and which are
not. The opportunity set includes informa-
tion on whether the production relation ship
between the two justices in some outcome is
one of rivalry (i.e. trade-oﬀ), independency,
or facilitation; and it dis tinguishes eﬃcient
from ineﬃcient allocations of scarce
 resources. 
As eﬃciency, when related to the
 primary normative objectives of intergenera-
tional and intragenerational justice, is a
 secondary normative objective, one conclu-
sion for policy-making is straightforward: in-
struments of justice should be used
eﬃciently; they should not be used ineﬃ-
ciently.
 outcomes below the JPF-curve correspond to
ineﬃcient uses of the instruments of justice,
whereas all outcomes on the curve corres pond
to eﬃcient uses of these instruments. 
Obviously, in point B there is rivalry
 between intragenerational and intergenera-
tional justice: attaining one to a higher
 degree necessarily reduces the degree to
which one attains the other one. This loss can
be measured by the concept of “opportunity
cost”. The opportunity cost of increasing,
say, intragenerational justice is the corres -
ponding minimal loss of intergenerational
justice. In contrast, at point A there is inde-
pendency between intragenerational and in-
tergenerational justice: attaining one to a
higher  degree does not necessitate any
change in the degree to which one attains the
other one. Hence, there are no opportunity
costs of  increasing one or the other  justice.
Generally, in all eﬃcient outcomes, i.e. on
the JPF-curve, there is rivalry between the
two justices and, thus, positive opportunity
costs. In all ineﬃcient outcomes, i.e. under
the JPF-curve, there is independency bet-
ween the two justices and, thus, zero oppor-
tunity costs.
For example, the opportunity set of
 Figure one may refer to the use of a non-
 renewable natural resource such as oil or gas:
the resource may be exploited today for social
welfare policy (intragenerational justice);
 alternatively, it may be conserved for future
generations (intergenerational justice).
In a diﬀerent context, the opportunity
set may look as in Figure two. The shaded
area again depicts all outcomes that are
 feasible in this context (“opportunity set”),
with the JPF-curve as its frontier. As in
 Figure one, outcomes A’ and B’ correspond
to an ineﬃcient and an eﬃcient use,  re -
spectiv ely, of the instruments of justice. Ob-
viously, all points on the JPF-curve between
C and D represent outcomes of eﬃcient uses
of the instrument of justice, because no  high -
er degree of attainment of one justice is fea-
sible without reducing the other one. These
outcomes are characterised by rivalry  between
the two justices and positive  opportunity
costs of either justice. 
Outcome E is ineﬃcient, but as it lies on
the JPF, attaining intergenerational  justice to
a higher degree starting from this point ne-
cessarily also leads to a higher degree of in-
tragenerational justice. That is, in outcome
E there is facilitation between the two
 justices. But facilitation is not symmet ric:
 attaining a higher degree of intragenerational
justice, starting again from point E, does not
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One important conclusion about the
production relationship between intra- and
intergenerational justice follows directly
from the very definition of eﬃciency. In out-
comes of eﬃcient resource use there is
 always rivalry between the diﬀerent justices
– attaining one justice to a higher degree
 necessarily reduces the degree to which the
other is attained. In contrast, in outcomes of
ineﬃcient resource use there is either inde-
pendency between the two justices – the
level of attainment of one justice can be im-
proved without doing worse on the other
one, or even both can be improved – or
 facilitation – improving the level of attain-
ment of one justice necessarily also improves
the other one.35
(2) Based on the opportunity set, economic
analysis can identify the “opportunity cost”
of attaining one justice to a higher degree,
in terms of less achievement of the other.
 Positive opportunity costs of achieving one
 justice exist if there is rivalry between the two
normative objectives of intergenerational and
intragenerational justice; negative opportu-
nity costs of achieving one justice exist if
there is facilitation between the two jus tices;
opportunity costs are zero if there is inde-
pendency between the two justices.
 Generally, negative and zero opportunity
costs indicate ineﬃciency in the allocation of
resources, while positive opportunity costs
indicate an eﬃcient resource allo cation. 
(3) Economic analysis can identify how the
opportunity set changes as its determinants –
natural, technological, institutional factors,
etc. – change. In particular, it can study how
the occurrence and extent of rivalry, inde-
pendency or facilitation in the relationship
between the two justices changes as underly-
ing determinants change. Hence, it may sug-
gest how to manage these underlying
determinants in order to decrease the degree
of rivalry and to increase the degree of inde-
pendency or facilitation.
The economic analysis presented here
cannot determine which of the eﬃcient  out -
comes on the justice possibility frontier is
preferable. Moving from one eﬃcient out-
come to another means incurring opportun ity
costs – i.e. furthering the degree of attainment
of one normative objective at the cost of the
other one. Depending on how the relation -
ship between the two normative  objectives is
shaped on the “value side”, it might well be
acceptable to incur these costs – for example,
burdening the presently  living with a small
tax that would prevent future generations
from huge damage. 
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So, economic analysis can give no clear
guidance on how to decide among eﬃcient
outcomes – i.e. in the case of rivalry between
objectives. Its contribution lies in pointing
out clearly ineﬃcient outcomes, and in iden-
tifying the opportunity costs of moving
from one eﬃcient outcome to another.
These insights can help make an in-
formed decision about how to use scarce re-
sources that have alternative uses to attain
the two normative objectives of inter- and
intragenerational justice in a non-wasteful
manner. This seems to be a valuable contri-
bution for societies facing decisions about
the use of scarce resources in view of diﬀe-
rent normative objectives of equal rank. Of
course, this would not make hard decisions
easy, but at least eﬃciently diﬃcult.
Notes
1 WCED 1987.
2 In addition, some conceptions of sustaina-
bility also include justice towards nature as a
third normative objective of equal rank.
3 This is the standard interpretation of mo-
dern economics according to Robbins 1932.
For an encompassing discussion of this and
other interpretations of economics, see
Hausman 2007.
4 This approach, as applied to the three jus -
tices included in the vision of sustainability –
intra- and intergenerational justice as well as
justice towards nature – has been called  
“sustainability economics” (Baumgärtner /
Quaas 2010, Baumgärtner 2011).
5 E.g. Gosepath 2007: 82.
6 Baumgärtner / Glotzbach / Stumpf 2011.
7 This “syntax” is our approach to structur -
ing what has been called the diﬀerent “di-
men sions” (Pogge 2006, Dobson 1998, see
also Ott / Döring 2008) of the concept of
 justice. It allows fully specifying a particular
 conception of justice.
8 Young 1994, Ott / Döring 2008: 59 et
seqq.
9 The delineation of the community of
 justice, especially the question of who is to
be included as a claim holder, can be drawn
according to diﬀerent criteria such as
 reciprocity, dignity, ability to experience
pain, etc. (e.g. Baumgärtner / Glotzbach /
Stumpf 2011).
10 The third justice often included in
 sustain ability conceptions, justice towards
nature, refers to claims held by “nature”, e.g.
higher non-human animals capable of expe-
riencing pain or of pursuing goals, against
humanity. Thus, the claim holders diﬀer,
while the claim addressees belong to the
group of currently living persons in all three
cases. While intra- and intergenerational
 justice reflect an anthropocentric idea of
 justice, according to which nature matters to
humans exclusively because of its instru-
mental value, the idea of justice towards na-
ture assigns an intrinsic value to nature
(Baumgärtner / Quaas 2010: Sec. 2), so that
“nature” becomes a claim holder in its own
right.
11“Goods” should be understood in a wide
sense.
12 Cf. Baumgärtner / Glotzbach / Stumpf
2011.
13 Pogge 2006: 863.
14 Sensu Dobson 1998: 73 et seqq.
15 Cf. Pogge 2006: 868.
16 LeGrand 1990: 555.
17 Barry 1965: Sec. 1.
18 E.g. Dobson 1998: 3 et seqq., Ott / Dö-
ring 2008, Visser´t Hooft 2007: 56, WCED
1987: 43.
19 Here, we extend the argument from
Glotzbach / Baumgärtner (in press, Sec. 3)
which originally refers to justice with regard
to the use and conservation of ecosystems.
20 Independency does not need to be sym-
metric: achieving one objective may be inde-
pendent of achieving the other one, but not
vice versa.
21 This relationship is similar to the concept
of “joint production” in economics, which
means that the production of a wanted good
necessarily gives rise to additional outputs
(cf. Baumgärtner et al. 2006).
22 This facilitation may be one-way, or the
other way, or a mutual facilitation between
the achievement of the two objectives.
23 Like independency and facilitation, ri-
valry does not need to be symmetric.
24 E.g. Dasgupta / Heal 1979.
25 E.g. Perman et al. 2003: 219 et seqq.
26 Scarcity is generally considered as central
to many important problems of justice
(Dobson 1998: 12).
27 Robbins 1932: 15.
28 This goes beyond what economists usu-
ally consider as ends (cf. Baumgärtner 2011).
Traditionally, economics has been concerned
with the end of an ever better satisfaction of
human needs and wants. This end can be
further specified and operationalised as indi-
vidual utilities (microeconomics), or as po-
licy goals such as low inflation and low
unemployment (macroeconomics).
29 According to the original criterion of Pa-
reto (1906), which assesses allocations based
on the wellbeing of individual persons, an al-
location of resources is eﬃcient if no one can
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9be made better oﬀ (in terms of this person’s
individual utility) without making anyone
else worse oﬀ (in terms of the other person’s
individual utility).  
30 LeGrand 1990: 559.
31 A cardinal metric is one that preserves
 orderings uniquely up to linear transfor -
mations; commensurability of justices
means that the metric of both justices is in
the same units.
32 LeGrand 1990: 560.
33 Here, we study the relationship, including
a potential trade-oﬀ, between two primary
normative objectives. There is also a discus-
sion on the so-called “equity-eﬃciency trade-
oﬀ” (surveyed by e.g. Putterman et al. 1998),
where equity and eﬃciency are treated as
normative objectives of equal rank. But eﬃ-
ciency – in contrast to equity – cannot serve
as a primary normative objective, so that this
trade-oﬀ is irrelevant (LeGrand 1990: 566).
34 In addition to the two fundamental
 shapes of the opportunity set discussed here,
other shapes are imaginable. For example,
the justice possibility frontier may be linearly
downward sloping, implying constant op-
portunity costs in all eﬃcient outcomes. It
may also be convex (resulting e.g. from in-
creasing returns to scale in the use of instru-
ments of justice), and the frontier may not
even intersect but asymptotically approach
the axes. This would imply that the oppor-
tunity costs of one justice may rise to infi-
nity. Yet, all insights into the relationships
between the two justices and eﬃciency that
are essential for our main line of argument
can already be obtained from the two shapes
of the opportunity set presented here. We
therefore refrain from discussing additional
shapes in detail.
35 In the (ineﬃcient) interior of the oppor-
tunity set there is always independency; and
facilitation can only occur on the ineﬃcient
part of the justice possibility frontier.
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